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Abstract 
Three management problems that a state (or a public administration acting on its behalf) 
faces in procuring goods and/or services are considered: a) choosing the type of a contract to 
be awarded and the type of a competitive bidding to determine the winning bid, b) setting the 
initial price for a contract being the subject of the bidding, and c) designing (or choosing) a 
set of rules for determining the winning bid by means of the chosen competitive bidding. 
Mathematical models and decision procedures for analyzing and solving these problems are 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Public procurement is an ample source of decision-making problems, and there are three key 
ones that a public administration faces in procuring goods and/or services. Choosing the type 
of a contract and the type of a competitive bidding to maximize the chances of successfully 
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implementing the contract for procuring goods and/or services under various procurement 
risks and in line with the existing laws constitutes the first problem. The second problem 
consists of setting an initial price for the contract to hold the bidding. The third problem is 
associated with designing a set of new rules for determining the winning bid or with 
choosing such rules from among available ones to help eliminate or reduce undesirable 
effects capable of affecting the quality of public procurement such as dumping prices, 
collusions, forming corrupt ties, etc. 
 
Among practically applicable decision procedures aimed at analyzing and solving the first 
problem (provided that the estimates of the probabilities of undesirable events to occur are 
available) the following two are considered: Nonlinear programming tools (applicable under 
some verifiable natural assumptions about the regularities describing the above probabilities) 
and elementary matrix analysis techniques (in the simplest cases). In the second problem, an 
equilibrium price strategy of the public administration in an auxiliary three-person game on 
polyhedral sets of disjoint player strategies is suggested to use as (or in determining) the 
initial price of the contract, and the requirements for information needed to develop such 
games, along with necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibriums in these games, 
are discussed. For the third problem, a new set of rules for determining the winning bid is 
proposed. These rules make dumping prices unreasonable for any bidder while reducing the 
chances of forming corrupt ties between a bidder and a public administration representative. 
Under these rules, the chances of every bidder to win the contract at a reasonable price 
acceptable for the public administration are higher than those of winning at the same price 
under the rule, where the lowest submitted bid wins. 
2. Maximizing the chances of successfully implementing a contract by optimally 
allocating available financial resources 
In awarding contracts to fulfill state, regional, or municipal orders, a public administration 
should take into account all the risks that may accompany both the placement and the 
implementation of the corresponding contacts. The pairs “a type of the contract—a type of 
the competitive bidding to determine the contract winner” form a set of the strategies that the 
administration can exercise to reduce the risks associated with placing and implementing 
each contract. 
 
Information about the chances of unfavorable events to impact the fulfillment of a particular 
order under the chosen strategies of placing and implementing a contract to fulfill the order 
can be presented in the form of a matrix. The matrix rows correspond to the above strategies, 
and each strategy is a combination of the type of a contract to be awarded and the type of a 
competitive bidding to be held to tender this contract. The matrix columns correspond to the 
unfavorable events that may occur in the course of both the placement and the 
implementation of the contract. For a particular order, each element of the matrix is the 
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probability of a particular unfavorable event (corresponding to the column in which this 
element is situated) to occur under a particular strategy (corresponding to the row in which 
this element is situated) chosen by the administration. It is further assumed that information 
necessary for calculating all the above probabilities is available, for instance, from expert 
estimates.  
 
Any public administration that places state, regional, or municipal orders may find itself in 
one of the following two financial situations: a) It has financial resources to spend to reduce 
the chances of the unfavorable events to occur, and b) it does not have such financial 
resources. 
 
Let  
i  be a strategy that the administration can choose in allocating a particular order, ,,1 mi ∈    
jC be an unfavorable event that may occur in the course of fulfilling the order, whose  
     occurrence disallows the order to be successfully fulfilled, ,,1 nj ∈  
b  be the amount of financial resources that the public administration can use to reduce the  
     chances (probabilities) of the unfavorable events to occur, 
)(AP be the probability of the event A , 
Q  be the event consisting of successfully fulfilling the order, 
A  be the negation of the event A .  
 
Assuming that all the events  jC  are pair-wise independent, one can easily be certain that the 
following relations hold: 
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In situation b), to calculate the probability )( ji CP for each particular strategy mii ,1, ∈  and to 
choose the strategy that maximizes this probability is the best the administration can do, 
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where )(QPi is the probability of successfully fulfilling the order by the winner of a tender 
(for the right to fulfill this order) under administration strategy i , i.e., under choosing a 
combination of the bidding procedure for allocating a contract and the type of the contract 
that correspond to row i  of the above matrix, )( ji CP is the probability that  the unfavorable 
event jC will not occur if the administration chooses strategy ,i  ,,1 mi ∈  .,1 nj ∈                     
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In situation a), one should find how the probabilities )( ji CP depend on the amount of 
financial resources that the administration can spend for reducing these probabilities, 
assuming that all the probabilities ),( ji CP ,,1 mi ∈ nj ,1∈ , can be reduced on account of 
certain activities, each requiring financing.  
 
Let jx , nj ,1∈  be the amount of financing that the administration spends in an attempt to 
reduce the risk of the unfavorable event jC  (that may affect the fulfillment of a particular 
order under consideration) to occur nj ,1∈ . It is natural to assume that the larger the jx , 
(generally) the larger the probabilities )( ji CP [ 1]. Also, it is natural to assume that for each 
,i ,,1 mi ∈  there is a certain threshold ijθ such that spending any amount of financial 
resources exceeding ijθ cannot reduce the probability )( ji CP  below its value at ijjx θ= . This 
“saturation” phenomenon is similar to the well-known one associated with the perception of 
advertising messages for goods and services [1]. 
 
Let )))((()( ijjiijij xCPxP =  be the functions reflecting the regularities that describe how the 
probability of the unfavorable event jC to occur under administration strategy i  depends on 
the financial resources ijx spent to reduce these probabilities.  Under the assumptions made, 
the functions )( ijij xP can be viewed as continuous, monotone functions decreasing (or non-
increasing) on the segment ],0[ ijθ and non-decreasing on the subset of real numbers ).,( ∞ijθ   
It is natural to assume that in all the situations that a public administration may face, the 
inequality        
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holds.  
 
The problem of optimally allocating financial resources to reduce the chances of unfavorable 
events to disallow the successfully fulfilling of the order under administration strategy 
,i mi ,1∈  can be formulated as follows: 
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This nonlinear programming problem can be solved by well-developed general nonlinear 
programming techniques, as well as by those developed for particular types of the functions 
)( ijij xP that may describe the above probabilities. (Several examples of such particular 
functions )( ijij xP  are considered in [1].) 
 
Thus, in situation b), when the financial resources are absent, one should solve problem (1), 
whereas in situation a), when the resources are available, one should solve problems (2) and 
find a number ∗i for which the equality   
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holds, where iM is a set of feasible solutions to problem  (2) corresponding to administration 
strategy mi ,1∈ .  
For particular types of the functions )( ijij xP  in problem (2), one may choose (or develop) 
solution methods that are more effective than general nonlinear programming techniques. 
For instance, if the functions )( ijij xP are as follows: 
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where the inequalities ,10 << ijα  ijij ax ij <
α
 for ijx θ≤≤ ij0  and 00 >ijp , mi ,1∈ , nj ,1∈  
hold, problem (2) for analyzing strategy i  takes the form 
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where .1 00 ijijij apq −=  In this problem, all the functions in the constraints and the goal 
function are posynomials or monomials, which may allow one to use ideas of geometric 
programming in developing techniques for solving the problem [1-3]. 
 
3. An approach to finding an initial price for a contract in a competitive bidding 
 
Let a state (public administration) have funds to finance the fulfillments of n  projects 
(orders), and let it consider several potential contractors interested in participating in a 
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competitive bidding to be held to tender n  contracts for developing and operating each 
project (for instance, for operating the objects to be created as a result of the project 
implementation). To hold the bidding, the state must set an initial price for each contract 
being the subject of the bidding.  
 
One approach to finding this price consists of determining “the best partner” from among 
legal entities interested in competing (or “the best pair of partners” if the development and 
the operation of all the projects are to be done by two different legal entities, respectively). 
Here, the “best partner” means a partner (or a pair of partners) that would agree to develop as 
many projects as possible at the volumes and at the prices acceptable to the public 
administration. Here, the administration is interested in minimizing its total cost associated 
both with developing and operating all the projects that will be implemented and with the 
failure to implement some of the projects (or all of them) at the desirable volumes. 
 
Let  
    m   be the number of projects that the state intents to implement within a certain period of  
          time ,T  
    iy   be the volume of work to be done in the framework of project i , mi ,1∈ , 
    ix   be the cost of developing a “unit volume” of project ,i mi ,1∈ , 
    iu   be the cost of operating a “unit volume” of project i  after the project completion,  
         mi ,1∈ , 
    k   be the share of the cost associated with operating each of the completed projects that is 
to be paid to the project developer according to the contract for developing the project, 
    ib  be the volume of the state’s demand for the objects to be created in the framework of 
project ,i mi ,1∈ , 
    iw  be the penalties associated with the failure to implement project i  at the “unit volume”  
mi ,1∈ , 
    iv  be the expenses associated with operating a “unit volume” of completed project ,i  
mi ,1∈  that the project developer bears according to the contract for developing the 
project, 
     is  be the revenue to be generated by a “unit volume” of project i  after the project  
          completion, mi ,1∈ , 
     l  be the share of the revenue to be generated by each of the completed projects that is to  
        be received by the project operator according to the contract for operating the projects. 
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Further, let 
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be vectors in ,mR and let the first three vectors ,,, HM ∈∈Ω∈ uxy where HM ,,Ω are 
polyhedra in mR+  described by compatible systems of linear inequalities. If the state were to 
find “the best partner” to develop all the projects and “the best partner” to operate them, it 
could consider the following three-person game with the payoff functions 
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where player 1, which is the state (or the public administration), needs to calculate Nash 
equilibrium points of the game ( )∗∗∗ xuy ,,  and to take component j of the vector ∗x  and 
component j of the vector ∗u  as the initial prices in the bidding for the contracts associated 
with developing and with operating project j , respectively. 
 
Proposition. The triple of vectors ( )∗∗∗ xuy ,,  is a Nash equilibrium point in Game 1 if and 
only if the pair of vectors ( )),(, ∗∗∗ xuy  is a saddle point in an auxiliary antagonistic game of 
players A  and B  with the payoff function 
 
                                                 ><−><+>< ywxyuy ,,,        (Game 2) 
 
on the sets of player strategies Ω  (for player A ) and MH × for (player B ). This proposition 
follows from the definition of a saddle point in an antagonistic game and from that of a Nash 
equilibrium point in a three-person game.  
 
Game 2 is a particular case of an antagonistic game with the payoff function 
 
                                                 ><+><+>< yqDyxxp ,,,       (Game 3) 
 
on the polyhedral set Ω× ~~M , where M~∈x and Ω∈ ~y , and both sets are described by 
compatible systems of linear inequalities. As shown in [4], finding equilibrium points in  
Game 3 on (generally unbounded) polyhedral sets M~ and Ω~ is equivalent to solving the 
auxiliary linear programming problems  
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forming a dual pair, where  
 
              { }dByDypzAyz ≥+≤≥= ,:0),(Q , { }bAxxDqtBxt ≥−−≤≥= ,:0),(P ,  
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DBA ,, are matrices, and zyxtqpdb ,,,,,,,  are vectors of corresponding dimensions.  
 
To develop Game 3, one needs information about the potential contractors interested in 
developing the projects and in operating them (after completing the contracts) to describe the 
polyhedra HM ,,Ω , along with the polyhedra M~ and Ω~  [5]. This information is needed to 
estimate the production potential of the contractors, which the public administration should 
do for all the prospective contractors to be invited, as well as for all the legal entities  
expected to participate in the bidding. Examples of developing the polyhedra M~ and Ω~   in 
industrial, agricultural, and transportation systems are presented in [5]. 
 
4. The description of a set of rules for determining the winner in a competitive bidding 
for a contract 
 
Throughout the rest of the article, only tender procedures in the form of sealed-bid auctions 
are the subject of consideration.  
 
If all the bidders were reputable, experienced companies, capable of completing a contract 
(the subject of the auction) timely and in line with the quality requirements, the risks of the 
auction organizer associated with both placing and implementing the contract would 
substantially be reduced. So designing sets of rules for determining the auction winner that 
would reduce both risks seems important. One such set of rules, proposed in [6] and further 
developed in [7], makes the auction attractive for both the auction organizer and the bidders. 
 
The idea underlying the rules is as follows: the auction organizer guarantees to the winner 
the contract price to be within the segment [ ]xkx, , where x  is the (unknown to the bidders) 
reserve price, and the value of ,k 10 << k  is announced. The auction winner is determined 
as follows: 
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     a) if all the submitted prices do not exceed ,kx then the bidder who has submitted the 
price that is either the closest to kx  (among all the submitted prices) or coincides with kx  is 
declared the winner, and the winning price is ,kx  
     b) if all the submitted prices are not lower than ,kx  then the bidder who has submitted the 
price that is either the closest to kx  (among all the submitted prices) or coincides with kx  is 
declared the winner, and the winning price is the price submitted by the winner, 
     c) if some of the bidders have submitted the prices that do not exceed ,kx  whereas the 
others have submitted the prices that are not lower than kx , rule a) applies, and the winning 
price is ,kx  
     d) if several bidders have submitted the same winning price, the winner is determined by 
an additional procedure, whereas the winning price is determined by either rule a) or rule b), 
     e) if all the submitted prices exceed x , the sealed-bid auction is considered as failed. 
 
It turns out that proceeding from a) a probabilistic evaluation of the chances that each of n  
bidders will submit its price within a certain range, and b) the reserve price for the contract, 
by solving some mathematical programming problems [5-6], the auction organizer can 
determine both x  and k  that minimize the probability )(TP  of the winning price to exceed 
.kx  In these problems the function )(TP takes one of the two forms 
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Here, a) fih is the price for the contract that the auction organizer believes that bidder i , say, 
a firm, is likely to submit as its bid, b) fih can vary within the segment fififi hhh ≤≤ , and c) 
f
ih  is a continuous, uniformly distributed random variable with the probability density 
function ),( fihp where 
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The rules possess the following feature: The chances of every bidder to win the contract at 
the price kx  are higher that those of winning it at this price under the rule, where the lowest 
bid always wins the contract, whereas the chances of every bidder to win the contract at a 
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price exceeding kx  are lower than those of winning it at the price kx . Thus, the proposed 
rules are advantageous for both the bidders and the auction organizer [6]. 
 
Also, the proposed rules a) do not discourage reputable potential bidders from submitting the 
bids that reflect their values of the contract and their ability to implement it with the required 
quality at the submitted price, since dumping prices is unprofitable for all the bidders, and b) 
encourage all the potential bidders to study both the market and their competitors in the bid. 
However, the proposed rules are vulnerable to forming corrupt ties, since once a particular 
bidder learns about the value of x , this bidder can submit kx  as the bid. 
 
A slight modification of the above rules can make them less vulnerable to potential corrupt 
activities. That is, if x  is the reserve price, the winning price is guaranteed to be within the 
segment [ ]xkx, , where the value of ,k 10 << k is announced, in just the same way it takes 
place under rules a) - e). However, the winner is determined as follows:  
     f) if all the submitted prices do not exceed kx , and not all of them are the same, then the 
bidder who has submitted (or a bidder from among those who have submitted) the price that 
is either next smaller than the closest to kx  price (if the price kx  has not been submitted by 
the bidders) or next smaller than kx  (if the price kx  has been submitted by at least one of 
the bidders) is declared the winner, and the winning price is kx , 
     g) if all the submitted prices are not lower than kx , and not all of them are the same, then 
the bidder who has submitted (or a bidder from among those who have submitted) the price 
that is either next greater than the closest to kx  price (if the price kx  has not been submitted 
by the bidders) or next greater than kx  (if the price kx  has been submitted by at least one of 
the bidders) is declared the winner, and the winning price is the price submitted by the 
winner, 
     h) if at least one from among all the submitted prices is smaller than kx , whereas at least 
one from among the other submitted prices is greater than kx , the winner is either 
determined by rule f) from among the bidders who have submitted the prices not exceeding 
kx  (if at least two different prices not exceeding kx  have been submitted) or the participant 
who has submitted (or a participant from among those who have submitted) the price that is 
smaller than kx  is declared the winner (if only one price smaller than kx  has been 
submitted), and the winning price is kx  in both cases, 
     i) if several bidders have submitted the same winning price, the winner is determined by 
an additional procedure, whereas the winning price is determined by rules f) - h), 
     j) if all the submitted prices exceed x , the sealed-bid auction is considered as failed. 
 
One can be certain that under the same natural assumptions that hold for rules a) - e), rules f) 
- j) possess the same above feature as do rules a) - e) while keeping the submission of 
dumping prices unprofitable for each auction participant. However, unlike rules a) - e), rules 
f) - j) make unreliable any guarantees to win the auction that the auctioneer can give to an 
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individual bidder, and thus they reduce the chances of forming corrupt ties between the 
auctioneer and an individual bidder in one-step, sealed-bid auctions (though they can nether 
block nor reduce the chances of forming corrupt ties among the auctioneer and more than 
one bidder or between the auctioneer and a cartel acting as a collective auction participant). 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
1. Though all the considered management problems are those arising in public procurement, 
decision procedures proposed for their analysis and solving are applicable in other fields, in 
particular, in public-private partnership, in planning advertising campaigns, and in a variety 
of sealed-bid auctions not associated with public procurement. 
 
2. Game 2 is the simplest among those on polyhedral sets that can be used in determining the 
initial prices for all the contracts to be awarded as a result of the bidding. If the contract 
developer and the company that will operate the “project results” can affect the choice of 
more than one vector out of the vectors ,,, uyx the considered problem of finding the initial 
prices for all the contracts that a public administration wants to implement becomes a game 
on a polyhedral set of connected vector strategies [8]. 
3. Game problems, both considered and referred to in this article, are those in which sets of 
player strategies are those of prices and volumes and have the form of linear inequalities. 
Information about the coefficients in these inequalities is always either available or can be 
obtained by every public administration from the past experience or from expert estimates. 
4. The proposed rules for determining the winner of a sealed-bid auction serve two particular 
goals: a) to discourage dumping prices by those potential contractors that may be interested 
in disallowing their reputable competitors to win a particular contract, and b) to discourage 
public administration representatives from establishing corrupt ties with participants of the 
tender. However, from the author’s viewpoint, these rules reflect no more than a possible 
approach to achieving the above goals, which is not an easy task. Both the potential of this 
approach and mathematical features of the proposed rules, as well as those of other possible 
approaches to achieving these goals, should be a subject of further studies.      
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